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YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Defending Progressive Prosecution:
A Review of Char ed by Emily a elon
Jeffrey Bellin
CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSEC TION AND END
MASS INCARCERATION. y Emily a elon. New York: Random House. 2019.
448 pp. $24.99.
Pro ressive prosecutors are takin over District Attorney s ffices
across the nation with a mandate to reform the criminal ustice system from
the inside. Emily Ba elon s new book, Charged: The New Movement to
Transform American Prosecution and End Mass Incarceration, chronicles
this potentially transformative moment in American criminal ustice.
his Essay hi hli hts the importance of Charged to modern criminal
ustice debates and levera es its concrete framin to offer a enerally
applicable theory of prosecutor driven criminal ustice reform. he theory
seeks to reconcile reformers newfound embrace of prosecutorial discretion
with lon standin worries, both inside and outside the academy, about the
dan erous accumulation of prosecutorial power. t also offers the potential
to broaden the reform movement s appeal beyond pro ressive urisdictions.
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INTROD CTION
The familiar concept of checks and balances captures the ideal of the
American criminal ustice system.1 Legislatures legislate, police arrest,
grand uries charge, prosecutors prosecute, uries convict, udges sentence,
parole boards release, governors pardon. The redundancy is the point. The
involvement of a multitude of independent actors guards against abuse of
the State’s most dangerous power: the power to punish.
For the past several decades, criminal ustice commentators mourned
the loss of checks and balances. Mandatory sentences removed udicial
discretion.2 Trials disappeared.3 Legislatures abolished parole.4 Pardons
became infrequent.5 Power accumulated in the hands of a single shadowy
actor, the prosecutor. Iconic legal scholar William Stunt observed in 2001
that, in the modern American system, checks and balances are an
illusion. 6 The criminal ustice system seems characteri ed by diffused
1.

See Richard A. ierschbach
Stephanos ibas, Constitutionally ailorin
Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 399 (2013) ( Checks and balances are
essential not only to the separation of powers in criminal ustice but also to
the promotion of morally appropriate punishments. ) Daniel S. McConkie,
Structurin Pre Plea Criminal Discovery, 107 . CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8
(2017) ( The criminal ustice system has historically had its own system of
checks and balances between the legislature, prosecutors, trial udges, and
the trial ury. ).

2.

Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment heorists Seekin Sentencin
Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 354 (2009) ( Sentencing enhancements
and mandatory minimum sentences give prosecutors undeniable power. ).

3.

Robert . Conrad, r.
aty L. Clements, he anishin Criminal Jury rial
From rial Jud es to Sentencin Jud es, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 103 (2018)
(documenting a decrease in criminal trials in the years 2006-16).

4.

See Graham v. Florida, 560 .S. 48, 109 10 (2010) (Thomas, ., dissenting)
(noting that through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress
abolished parole for federal offenders and several States have followed
suit ).

5.

Rachel E. arkow, he Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1348-49 (2008) ( T he percentage of federal
grants of clemency applications has declined sharply and s tate level
pardons have also fallen in recent decades. ).

6.

William . Stunt , he Patholo ical Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 599 (2001)
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power, but its real difficulty is that it concentrates power in prosecutors. 7
Today, Stunt ’s view stands triumphant. Commentators assail the
prosecutor king 8 who presides over the criminal ustice system, wielding
virtually unchecked powers 9 to generate mass incarceration and foster
in ustice.10
The prosecutor-king narrative takes an intriguing turn in an excellent
new book by Emily a elon, Char ed he ew Movement to ransform
American Prosecution and End Mass ncarceration.11 a elon, a New York
Times ournalist and member of the Yale Law School faculty, begins with
the familiar critique. a elon argues in her Introduction that American
prosecutors use their breathtaking power to generate disastrous results
for millions of people churning through the criminal ustice system. 12 The
novelty of Char ed is that it goes on to make a compelling case that the
solution to the system’s many problems is for prosecutors to take on an
even more prominent role. To dethrone the kings of the courtroom, 13
commentators like Stunt urged legislators, udges, and other actors to
create more robust checks on prosecutor power.14 Flipping the script,
7.

d.

8.

See, e. ., Erik Luna, Prosecutor Kin , 1 STAN. . CRIM. L.

9.

enneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy
Case Studies in an Emer in Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 887 (1998).

10.

See ANGELA . DAVIS, AR ITRARY STICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSEC TOR
17 (2007) ( P rosecutorial discretion is largely responsible for the
tremendous in ustices in our criminal ustice system. ) OHN F. PFAFF, LOC ED
IN: THE TR E CA SES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM
206 (2017) ( Prosecutors have been and remain the engines driving mass
incarceration. ) Erik Luna Marianne Wade, ntroduction to Prosecutorial
Power A ransnational Symposium, 67 WASH. LEE L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2010)
( P rosecutors are the criminal ustice system. ).

11.

EMILY
PROSEC

12.

AZELON,

CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT

TION AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2019).

TO

POL’Y 48 (2014).

TRANSFORM AMERICAN

d. at xxv.

13.

he
Kin s
of
the
Courtroom,
ECONOMIST
(Oct.
4,
2014),
https: www.economist.com united-states 2014 10 04 the-kings-of-thecourtroom https: perma.cc S2G - 3
.

14.

See Stunt , supra note 6, at 587 ( The last, and probably best, solution is to
increase udicial power over criminal law. ) see also RACHEL ELISE AR OW,
PRISONERS OF POLITICS 9 (2019) ( One key pillar of reform is to institute
greater checks on prosecutors. ) PFAFF, supra note 10, at 159 (emphasi ing
the need to regulate prosecutors’ behavior as the key to reform).
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Char ed calls upon prosecutors to counteract the system’s severity by
taking decisions out of the hands of udges, uries, legislators, and police.
a elon explains: The power of the D.A. makes him or her the actor
the only actor who can start to fix what’s broken without changing a
single law. 15
a elon is no outlier. Char ed highlights a ma or new phenomenon
that threatens to upend the longstanding academic consensus. Outside the
ivory halls, the reform conversation no longer centers prosecutorial power
as the disease afflicting the criminal ustice system. Prosecutors are the
cure. The Darth Vader of criminal ustice commentary has become its
Captain Marvel.16
Char ed skillfully narrates the di ying developments of the past two
years that changed the criminal ustice reform conversation. Selfproclaimed progressive prosecutors are winning elections in ma or
American cities, spearheading a national movement to leverage
prosecutorial power to achieve criminal ustice reform. 17 Larry rasner in
Philadelphia. im Foxx in Chicago. Marilyn Mosby in altimore. Rachel
Rollins in oston. Chesa oudin in San Francisco. ohn Creu ot in Dallas.18
15.

AZELON, supra note 11, at xxvii see also id. at 296 ( The movement to elect a
new kind of prosecutor is the most promising means of reform I see on the
political landscape. ).

16.

effrey ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power hrou h the Lens of Mass
ncarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 837 (2018) ( Prosecutors are the Darth
Vader of academic writing: mysterious, powerful and, for the most part,
bad. ) hereinafter ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power . Darth Vader is
the villain in the Star Wars movies Captain Marvel is the most powerful
Avenger superhero. See Anyone nder 30.

17.

See effrey ellin, heories of Prosecution, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2020)
hereinafter ellin, heories of Prosecution Angela . Davis, Reima inin
Prosecution A Growin Pro ressive Movement, 3 CLA CRIM. ST. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(2019) (arguing that progressive prosecutors us e their power and
discretion with the goals of not only enforcing the law, but also reducing
mass incarceration, eliminating racial disparities, and seeking ustice for all,
including the accused ) David Sklansky, he Pro ressive Prosecutor s
Handbook, 50 .C. DAVIS L. REV. Online 25 (2017) (discussing the movement)
Editorial oard, A Wiser Generation of Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017),
https: www.nytimes.com 2017 02 06 opinion a-wiser-generation-ofprosecutors.html https: perma.cc E8Z-T2MZ (embracing the new wave
of local prosecutors who are open to rethinking how they do their
enormously influential obs ).

18.

See Farah Stockman, How End Mass ncarceration Became a Slo an for D.A.
Candidates,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
25,
2018),
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The list is long and growing. a elon estimates that, already, 12 percent of
the population live s in a city or county with a D.A. who . . . could be
considered a reformer. 19 With progressive prosecutors taking the helm,
traditional academic proposals to limit prosecutorial power seem
increasingly pass .20 Reformers no longer cry out for checks on
prosecutors. Instead, they want everyone to get out of prosecutors’ way.
Char ed does as good a ob as any book in recent memory of weaving
together individual stories, timely reporting, and the latest criminal ustice
research. Synthesi ing this material, a elon makes a strong case that the
new wave of prosecutors, not legislators, governors, police, or udges,
hold the key to change. 21 y anchoring her analysis in deeply-researched
case studies, she fosters refreshingly precise thinking as opposed to
slogans about what we should expect from prosecutors. a elon also
provides a helpful explanation for reformers’ prosecutorial focus. She
writes: While it would be nice if lawmakers and the courts threw
themselves into fixing the criminal ustice system, in the meantime,
elections for prosecutors represent a shortcut to addressing a lot of
dysfunction. 22 The key benefit of this approach is speed. W e can stop

https: www.nytimes.com 2018 10 25 us texas-district-attorney-racemass-incarceration.html https: perma.cc Z24-C Y3 (so characteri ing
rasner, Rollins, and Creu ot) Allison Young, he Facts on Pro ressive
Prosecutors,
CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Mar.
19,
2020),
https: www.americanprogress.org issues criminalustice reports 2020 03 19 481939 progressive-prosecutors-reformingcriminal- ustice https: perma.cc 97L -C WP (so characteri ing Foxx
and oudin) Tim Prudente, Baltimore State s Attorney Mosby Stands with
Pro ressive Prosecutors, Also Airs Dispute with Gov. Ho an at St. Louis Rally,
ALT. S N ( an. 15, 2020), https: www.baltimoresun.com politics bs-md-ci-20200115-r6 3hfsllbh3vcdpx oaq36gqu-story.html
https: perma.cc 9ST-SG4W (so characteri ing Mosby).
19.
20.

21.
22.
222

AZELON, supra note 11, at 290.

See Erik Luna Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Jud es, 67 WASH. LEE L. REV.
1413, 1417 (2010) (describing academic solutions to the problems of
prosecutorial discretion as taking two forms: the promulgation of internal
office guidelines to control prosecutorial decision-making and the
development of external limitations through restrictive legislation or
heightened udicial review ).
AZELON, supra note 11, at xxvii.

d. at xxxi.
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caging people needlessly ri ht now if we choose prosecutors who will open
the locks. 23
For those versed in the frustrating politics of criminal ustice reform,
a elon’s message holds great appeal. Char ed’s primary weakness is its
tendency, like the progressive prosecution movement it describes, to
preach to the converted. Char ed and the prosecutor-driven reform
movement target the like-minded, i.e., political progressives, a minority
of the American population.24 Yet the new vision of prosecutors that
emerges from a elon’s narrative has the potential to appeal to a broader
constituency.
To achieve more mainstream appeal, both among academic theorists
and non-progressive voters, the prosecutor-driven-reform movement
must overcome two ob ections. The first ob ection points to an apparent
internal inconsistency in Char ed and the movement it chronicles. Char ed
simultaneously laments the accumulation of prosecutorial power while
celebrating the use of that power to achieve progressive policies. This may
look to critics like an uncomfortable in ection of politics into District
Attorney’s Offices.25 Commentators often oppose presidential power, for
example, right up until a presidential election. nchecked executive power
is good for my President, not yours. If this is all that is going on, then the
inspirational rhetoric of progressive prosecution masks a mundane
effort to draft local prosecutors into the familiar partisan power struggles
that afflict the rest of government.26 A second, related ob ection is that an
even more prosecutor-dominated future eopardi es the system’s
separation of powers, further weakening its checks and balances. Critics
argue that progressive prosecutors exceed their traditional lawenforcement function: prosecutors are not supposed to counteract
23.

d.

24.

a elon relates a concern expressed by a Republican District Attorney from
Wisconsin, that the national reform movement seemed like a liberals-only
cause. d. at 155. See also Lydia Saad, Conservative Lead in .S. deolo y s
Down to Sin le Di its, GALL P ( an. 11, 2018), https: news.gallup.com poll
225074 conservative-lead-ideology-down-single-digits.aspx
https: perma.cc W63 -2M6Y ( Thirty-five percent of .S. adults in 2017
identified as conservative and 26 as liberal. ).

25.

Cf. David Alan Sklansky, he Chan in Political Landscape for Elected
Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. . CRIM. L. 647, 650 (2017) (highlighting the risk that
prosecutorial decision-making will become inappropriately politici ed ).

26.

For example, a elon praises the ability of local prosecutors to stand up to
Trump and fight the Trump administration. AZELON, supra note 11, at
xxviii, 92.
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legislative policy decisions or usurp udges and uries by unilaterally
redefining the punishment (if any) for statutory crimes.27 D istrict
attorneys do not make laws. That is the ob of the Legislature. 28
Against this tumultuous backdrop, this Essay has two goals. Most
obviously, I seek to spotlight a elon’s important new book the first to
document a powerful new feature of the American criminal ustice
landscape. Next, I want to leverage a elon’s crisp framing of the issues to
answer these two powerful ob ections to prosecutor-driven criminal
ustice reform. As explained below, I think a clear principle answers both
ob ections. This principle can filter progressive prosecution into a nonpartisan formula, focusing on lenience (and checks and balances) rather
than nominally progressive sensibilities. At the same time, this generallyapplicable framework can help to reconcile the shifting landscape of
American prosecution with traditional academic narratives of criminal
ustice.
While I develop my answer to the ob ections to prosecutor-driven
reform in the body of this Essay, I can sketch the contours here in the
Introduction. The answer begins with a clearer conception of the American
prosecutor’s role, and prosecutorial power generally. Despite its
popularity, the prosecutor-king narrative pioneered by Stunt and
27.

See, e. ., onathan Edwards, orfolk Prosecutor Can t Dismiss All Mari uana
Cases, ir inia Supreme Court Says, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (May 3, 2019),
https: pilotonline.com news local crime article d260c5ce-6d3f-11e996bb-0364d44e54da.html https: perma.cc 66L7-ML N (noting that both
sides believed the other side was violating the state constitution’s division
of powers ) Tom ackman, n Some Bi Cities, Reform Minded Prosecutors
and Police Chiefs Have Been At dds, WASH. POST ( uly 17, 2019),
https: www.washingtonpost.com crime-law 2019 07 17 prosecutorslaunch-reforms-police-chiefs-convene-national-summit-dc-with-districtattorney-counterparts https: perma.cc RR3-7 PN (quoting D.C. Police
Chief’s criticism: police and prosecutors take an oath to enforce the laws
and should not unilaterally decide they can decline to prosecute certain
crimes ) Alicia Victoria Lo ano
Lauren Mayk, .S. Attorney McSwain,
Philadelphia District Attorney Krasner Clash Despite Shared ision for Safer
City, N C PHILA. ( une 20, 2019), https: www.nbcphiladelphia.com news
local S-Attorney-William-McSwain-Philadelphia-District-Attorney-Larryrasner-Clash-Despite-Shared-Vision-for-Safer-City-511582102.html
https: perma.cc 7DEP-7DWT (offering similar criticism).

28.

Michael D. O’ eefe, he rue Role of he District Attorney, OS. GLO E (May
28, 2019), https: www.bostonglobe.com opinion 2019 05 28 the-truerole-district-attorney VW CgWHw2rI8mYOom YpyN story.html
https: perma.cc E632- E7C .
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animating Char ed is hyperbolic. Prosecutors are not unilaterally doling
out America’s criminal ustice outcomes. Contrary to the prominent voices
quoted throughout Char ed29 and in the academic literature,30 mass
incarceration did not arise because increasingly aggressive prosecutors
sei ed too much power from hapless legislators and udges.31 Rather, the
phenomenon came about through a slow-developing consensus among
those, including prosecutors, who were supposed to check the State s
power to punish.32 Legislators, udges, police, governors, voters, etc., are
not shocked, shocked’ at the outputs of the American criminal ustice
system. 33 Mass incarceration arose when all of these important actors
umped on the same tough-on-crime bandwagon.34 As American
incarceration rates reached unprecedented heights, traditional checks on
the ability of any one actor (such as a prosecutor) to impose punishment
remained in place. They ust were not exercised as often. 35
A consensus, rather than prosecutor-centered explanation, for
American punitiveness shines a clarifying light on the role of the American
prosecutor and the available pathways for prosecutor-driven reform.
Progressive prosecutors are not well positioned to reverse mass
incarceration because of their breathtaking power relative to other
actors36 or because prosecutors are the criminal ustice system. 37
Prosecutors can reduce the criminal ustice system’s severity because it

29.

AZELON, supra note 11, at xxv-xxvi ( unfettered power of prosecutors )
132-133 (citing to ohn Pfaff), 338 (citing to Angela Davis), 360-361 (citing
to ed Rakoff and William Stunt ).

30.

See ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power, supra note 16, at 854
(summari ing academic trends).

31.
32.
33.
34.

35.
36.
37.

d.
See effrey ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y. . L. REV. 171, 200 (2019)
hereinafter ellin, he Power of Prosecutors .
d.
See EREMY TRAVIS ET AL. EDS., NAT’L RESEARCH CO NCIL, THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE NITED STATES: E PLORING CA SES AND CONSE ENCES 70
( eremy Travis et al. eds., 2014).
d.

ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 200.

AZELON, supra note 11, at xxv.

Luna

Wade, supra note 10, at 1285.
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takes a village to incarcerate, 38 and any dissenting actor in the chain can
short-circuit the State’s power to punish.
Cutting through the illusion of prosecutor dominance reveals an
important, if nuanced, distinction between the two opposing dimensions of
the prosecutorial function. Sometimes prosecutors seek to punish. To do
so, they require consensus. This is where checks and balances and
separation of powers play a critical role. Prosecutors react to decisions by
legislators who define offenses and authori e punishments, and police
who investigate and arrest. Prosecutors then work to obtain the approval
of uries and udges to impose legislatively-authori ed (or mandated)
punishments. Parole boards, udges, and governors ad ust sentences on
the back end, after conviction. Through it all, great power is exercised. ut
it is an expression of the State’s power, not the prosecutor’s power. When
it comes to imposing punishment, prosecutorial power is contingent on
other actors. This inability to inflict punishment unilaterally is the essence
of our system’s checks and balances and the proper focus for concerns
about their erosion.
Prosecutors also exercise a power of lenience. In this role, prosecutors
are themselves acting as a check on the State’s power to punish. ust like
other powerful criminal ustice actors, such as police, prosecutors are
supposed to act unilaterally to dispense lenience. No consensus is required.
(Think of the police officer who gives a speeding motorist a warning rather
than a ticket.) In this context, prosecutorial power may well counteract the
will of other actors. A prosecutor who announces that she will no longer
enforce mari uana laws frustrates a legislature that recently rebuffed
efforts to repeal those laws. Yet this is not a repudiation of checks and
balances or a violation of separation of powers. The prosecutor’s action
illustrates these concepts in action the prosecutor is acting as a check on
the State’s power to punish. Importantly, prosecutorial lenience is itself
sub ect to restraint through political accountability. In almost every State,
chief prosecutors are elected.39 While American voters have traditionally
38.

ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power, supra note 16, at 837 see also ellin,
he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 181 ( The track is laid by
legislators and passes through critical gateways controlled by police, udges,
and other actors. A ourney on that track begins when the police arrest a
person and deliver the case to the prosecutor for a charging decision. ut no
punishment may be imposed until a ury convicts or the defendant agrees,
with udicial approval, to plead guilty. And even then, a udge (or legislature)
selects the punishment. ).

39.

Angela . Davis, he American Prosecutor ndependence, Power, and the
hreat of yranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 451 (2001) ( O nly the District of

226

DEFENDING PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION

shown little interest in reining in officials who act too punitively, voters
can and do counteract unpopular leniency at the ballot box.40
This twofold conceptuali ation of prosecutorial power offers the raw
material for fashioning a neutral principle that can animate prosecutordriven criminal ustice reform and expand the movement’s appeal. y
focusing on the prosecutor’s structural role as a check on the State’s power
to punish, reformers avoid the corrosive partisanship that mars the
modern political landscape. Importantly, this framing of the District
Attorney as a check on government overreach can radiate beyond
progressive strongholds to moderate and conservative urisdictions sorely
in need of prosecutor-driven reform.41
Reform-minded prosecutors animated by a principle of lenience would
work to broadly ratchet down, not redistribute, the system’s severity. As a
result, a more robust prosecutorial role would not exacerbate worries
about the accumulation of prosecutorial power or the erosion of the
system’s separation of powers. A new wave of aggressively lenient
prosecutors would be performing, not repudiating, the American ideal of
checks and balances.
I.

TWO FACES OF PROSEC TORIAL POWER

Char ed anchors its discussion in two case studies. a elon explains:
These two stories illustrate the damage prosecutors can do and also the
precious second chances they can extend that allow people to make things
right in their own lives. 42 As discussed below, the stories also highlight
distinct dimensions of prosecutorial power. The first story invites analysis
of prosecutorial decision-making in the face of policy disagreement,
specifically disagreement between a prosecutor and the New York
Legislature about the proper punishment for unlawfully carrying a loaded
gun. This is where progressive prosecution can contribute most
meaningfully to the American criminal ustice landscape, offering the
prospect of leniency to those guilty of statutory crimes. The second story
explores prosecutors’ power to punish, a power wielded improperly, in
a elon’s view, in a Tennessee murder prosecution. As I will explain, the
Tennessee story, while important, offers little direct support for
Columbia and four states Delaware, New ersey, Rhode Island, and
Connecticut maintain a system of appointed prosecutors. ).
40.

See infra text accompanying notes 149-153.

41.

See ellin, heories of Prosecution, supra note 17, at 1250-51.

42.

AZELON, supra note 11, at xxix.
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progressive prosecution or transformative prosecutorial power. Instead,
this story illustrates generally-applicable dangers of prosecutorial excess
and the importance of existing checks against government overreach.
A.

Kevin

The first case study focuses on the prosecutor’s power to decline to
pursue a case against a defendant who, after committing a criminal
offense, faces severe penal consequences. This is the power of lenience,
which I describe elsewhere as the unreviewable ability to (discretely)
open exits from an otherwise inflexible system. 43 This story, and
thousands like it, lie at the core of the potential for prosecutor-driven
criminal ustice reform. The story is evin’s.
evin, a pseudonym, is a twenty-year-old resident of the rownsville
neighborhood in rooklyn.44 As evin tells it, one night, he is hanging out
with friends in an apartment. A loaded handgun sits on a table near the
front door. As one friend leaves the apartment, police appear outside as if
they were about to knock. 45 Seeing the gun inside, the police burst in
through the open door. 46 evin grabs the gun and takes off running. The
officers quickly apprehend him. An officer asks the group whose gun it
was. evin explains, I had the gun on me, so it was only right to say it was
mine. 47
a elon’s narrative shifts to a rooklyn court where, if you knew how
to look for it, the proceedings offered a display of enormous
prosecutorial power. 48 She explains: The prosecutors held power in the
rooklyn gun court, and evin had entered the system at a moment in
which that was more true, in courts across the country, than ever
before. 49
43.

ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power, supra note 16, at 835.

44.

AZELON, supra note 11, at xiii.

45.

d. at xix.

46.

d. at xx (describing police entry), 23 (describing police observing the gun).

47.

d. at xxi. a elon explains evin’s actions as taking the gun charge for his
friend, Chris. d. at 33. Notably, the friend’s possession of the firearm would
have been a less serious offense. N.Y. PENAL LAW
265.03(3) ( Such
possession shall not . . . constitute a violation of this subdivision if such
possession takes place in such person’s home. ).

48.
49.
228

AZELON, supra note 11, at xxiii.

d. at xxv.
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Anyone familiar with the academic literature will recogni e this
conceptuali ation of prosecutor power.50 They may also know that I am
not a fan.51 I critique this common framing in another piece because:
It removes the legislature from the equation by framing the
criminal ustice system as a discrete, unchangeable set of
pathways. It overlooks the role of police by spontaneously placing
the defendant on the track awaiting the decision of the powerful
prosecutor. And it discounts the influence of udges, parole and
probation officers, and governors.52
a elon’s case study provides an opportunity to clarify my
disagreement with this framing of prosecutorial power and (helpfully, I
hope) distinguish between two kinds of power, one that the prosecutor
can exercise unilaterally and another that the prosecutor cannot. The
prosecutor’s power to punish evin derives from actions already taken by
the legislature and police. Going forward, the prosecutor’s power to punish
will be contingent on what uries and udges do in this or similar cases.
Yes, the prosecutor can send evin to prison but only if a chorus of other
powerful criminal ustice actors concur.
The prosecutor does have a power that can be exercised unilaterally. It
is not the power to punish. It is the power to let evin go. Like the police
officer who could have declined to arrest evin,53 the legislatures of many
states that do not criminali e gun possession,54 or the Supreme Court,
coincidentally on the verge of declaring a constitutional right to carry a
gun,55 the prosecutor can let evin off the legal hook. This power is
especially meaningful here because the criminal case against evin is open
and shut. The famous aphorism about legal strategy comes to mind: If the
facts are against you, argue the law. If the law is against you, argue the

50.

ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 200 (highlighting this type
of framing as epitomi ing the genre of academic commentary).

51.

d.

52.

d.

53.

See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 CRIMINAL PROCED RE 13.2(b) (4th ed. 2017)
( D iscretion is regularly exercised by the police in deciding when to
arrest. ).

54.

See effrey ellin, he Ri ht to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. . L. REV. 1, 17-19
(2015) (chronicling state gun law landscape).

55.

d. at 18-21 (chronicling likely tra ectory of Supreme Court Second
Amendment rulings).
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facts. If the law and the facts are against you, pound the table and yell like
hell. 56
evin’s attorney, and a elon, who is openly in evin’s corner, are in
pound the table mode.
Start with the facts. Even in evin’s own recounting, he is guilty of
possessing a loaded firearm.57 The police caught him red-handed.
The law is even worse for evin. Well before his arrest, New York
enacted a strict set of statutes criminali ing unlicensed gun possession,
with a goal of suppressing gun violence. evin himself recogni es the
public policy dilemma that faced the legislature. As a elon explains: The
year evin was twelve, more than a hundred people were shot in and
around rownsville and another thirty were killed . . . . Guns were a fact of
life. I could find someone with a gun before I could find someone with a
diploma,’ evin told me.’ 58
It is helpful to a candid discussion of the prosecutor’s role that evin’s
offense is a non-trivial gun crime a type of law that many progressives
support. a elon’s view of guns is fatalistic: The guns could be no more
controlled, in the end, than the damage they did could be contained. 59 Yet
later in the book, a elon notes the ama ing transformation of New York
City and rownsville. rownsville had once been as violent as any crimeridden city in the developing world. Now it was safer than the wealthy
parts of New York were a generation ago. 60 The damage that guns used to
do in New York City has been contained.61 Maybe they are wrong, but New

56.

GoodReads, Carl Sandbur uotes,
https: www.goodreads.com quotes
918291-if-the-facts-are-against-you-argue-the-law-if
https: perma.cc MT4S-P2DM .

57.

See People v. Minervini, 22 Misc. 3d 1112(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) ( T o
convict the defendant of that crime, the People would be required to prove
he unlawfully possessed a loaded and operable firearm, and that such
possession did not take place in his home or place of business.’ ).

58.

AZELON, supra note 11, at xiv-xv.

59.

d. at xviii.

60.

d. at 199.

61.
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See effrey ellin, he nverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and
Effectiveness of ew York City Stop and Frisk , 94 . . L. REV. 1495, 1520
(2014) (
etween 1990 and 2012, while the City’s population grew by
almost a million people, the number of homicides dropped from 2,245 to
419. ) (citing FRAN LIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT ECAME SAFE: NEW YOR ’S
LESSONS FOR R AN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 4 (2011).
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York’s politicians (including progressives) claim that the strict
enforcement of gun laws deserve some of the credit.62
A key component of New York’s gun suppression efforts are four
handgun possession offenses, each titled criminal possession of a
weapon (CPW) and distinguished by degrees. a elon characteri es the
four CPW offenses as a menu of options of varying severity, from which
the prosecutor selects according to taste.63 The prosecutor’s role in
selecting a charge, a elon suggests, is to get it right by determining,
How dangerous was evin What punishment did he deserve, and what
consequence for him would serve the community’s interests 64
At least on its face, the charging dynamic is more static. New York’s
legislature does not really frame its gun laws as a menu. Each offense
applies to a different factual scenario:
• CPW (First Degree): a person possesses ten or more firearms 65
• CPW (Second Degree): a person possesses any loaded firearm 66
• CPW (Third Degree): (i) the person has a prior criminal conviction 67
or (ii) the firearm has been defaced for the purpose of concealment or
prevention of the detection of a crime 68 and
• CPW (Fourth Degree) (misdemeanor): a person possesses any
firearm . . . . 69
62.

See, e. ., Press Release, New York City, Mayor Bill de Blasio Joins Mayors
A ainst lle al Guns ( an. 30, 2014), https: www1.nyc.gov office-of-themayor news 725-14 mayor-bill-de-blasio- oins-mayors-against-illegalguns (quoting mayor urging vigorous enforcement of gun laws) George
Pataki,
Frisks
Save
Lives,
N.Y.
POST,
( uly
11,
2012),
https: nypost.com 2012 07 11 frisks-save-lives (writing, as a former
New York Governor, that establishing mandatory minimum sentences for
illegal gun possession made the city and state safer ) see infra text
accompanying notes 86-89.

63.

The law that governed here gave the D.A.’s office an array of options.
AZELON, supra note 11, at xxiii, 134.

64.

d. at xxiii.

65.

N.Y. PENAL LAW 265.04.

66.

d. 265 (class C (violent) felony)
3.5-year sentence).

67.

a elon relates evin’s two previous run-ins with the law, but since both
cases appear to have been resolved without a conviction, this charge likely
did not apply. AZELON, supra note 11, at xvi, xvii.

68.

N.Y. PENAL LAW 265.02 (class D (violent) felony)
mandatory two-year sentence).

70.02(3)(b) (providing for a mandatory

70.02(3)(c) (providing a
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Given this framework, it is unsurprising that rooklyn’s progressive
prosecutors ultimately charge evin with CPW (Second Degree). The
charge does not reflect the prosecutor’s perception of
evin’s
dangerousness or the community’s interest. It reflects the fact that the
firearm evin possessed was loaded.
In any event, any disagreement about charging is quickly subsumed by
the realities of American criminal ustice. As in many cases, evin’s initial
charge is the beginning, not the end, of the process. Due to America’s
tendency to criminali e frequently-engaged-in behavior and vigorously
police violations, this country’s courts are overwhelmed.70 This means that
prosecutors face strong pressure to bargain for admissions of guilt.
pwards of ninety-five percent of criminal convictions result from guilty
pleas.71 The CPW (Second Degree) charge is an initial offer a signal of
what the prosecution believes its evidence will prove at trial. If evin is
willing to plead guilty, preserving court resources and foregoing the
potential for an acquittal, the prosecutor will reduce the charge or offer
other concessions.
In evin’s case, each side feels pressure to bargain. For the prosecutor,
there is a significant likelihood of a loss at trial. a elon reports that as the
case progresses through the New York courts: (1) the udge assigned to
evin’s case excludes his statement to police that the gun was his and (2)
a government test on material found on the gun grip fails to turn up
evin’s DNA.72 These are important developments, not because they
suggest evin is innocent. We know from evin’s own account that he
committed the charged offense. Rather, they increase the chances that a
ury will acquit. Litigants bargain in the shadow of trial. 73 For the
69.

N.Y. PENAL LAW 265.01.

70.

See ISSA OHLER-HA SMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL CO RTS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF RO EN WINDOWS POLICING (2018) (chronicling the
dysfunction of New York courts) Adam M. Gershowit
Laura R. illinger,
he State ever Rests How E cessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal
Defendants, 105 NW. . L. REV. 261, 278 (2011) (documenting enormous state
prosecutor caseloads and resulting problems).

71.

See Missouri v. Frye, 566 .S. 134, 143 (2012) ( Ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the
result of guilty pleas. ).

72.
73.
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AZELON, supra note 11, at 122-23.

ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 210 ( udges and
legislatures indirectly dictate the terms of prosecutors’ plea offers by setting
the backdrop against which defendants assess those offers. )
ellin,
Reassessin Prosecutorial Power, supra note 16, at 850 ( Studies suggest that
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prosecutor, the shadow of a rooklyn ury trial has begun to look
ominous.74
The shadow of trial doesn’t look so great for evin either. He has a real
chance at an acquittal but, if evin loses at trial, the mandatory sentence
that attaches to the CPW (Second Degree) offense means that even a
sympathetic udge cannot keep him out of prison.75 Of course, evin has
little incentive to plead guilty to the char ed offense. If he is going to be
convicted of carrying a loaded firearm, he might as well take his chances at
trial. The obvious middle ground involves a guilty plea to the misdemeanor
(unloaded) firearm offense, a crime that does not include any mandatory
sentence but would result in a criminal record and udicially-selected
sentence.
a elon would like prosecutors to look beyond the shadow of trial to
loftier considerations. She highlights the needs of the community, the
threat (if any) posed by evin’s conduct and, ultimately, ustice.76 In light
of the severe sentence that attaches to the offense, a elon believes that
prosecuting evin for CPW (Second Degree) is un ust. That makes sense. It
is important to acknowledge, however, the import of this position. a elon
and those who champion progressive prosecution are not ust asking
prosecutors to reform their own excesses (that’s the theme of a elon’s
second case study, which we will get to below). evin’s CPW (Second
Degree) charge is not an example of overcharging it is the charge that
precisely fits the provable facts.77 If CPW (Second Degree) is the wrong
charge, as a elon contends, then we are asking prosecutors to
undercharge. Specifically, we are asking prosecutors to reverse a specific
policy choice made by the legislature and supported by other important
criminal ustice actors, such as police.78 This dynamic lies at the core of the
progressive prosecution movement. It is the same dynamic in play when
progressive prosecutors announce that they will not prosecute offenses

plea deals across a large number of cases reflect a predictable discount from
generally agreed-upon, likely trial outcomes. ).
74.

See David N. Dorfman Chris . Ii ima, Fictions, Fault, and For iveness Jury
ullification in a ew Conte t, 28 . MICH. .L. REFORM 861, 886-87 (1995)
(reporting high acquittal rates for rooklyn gun possession cases).

75.

See supra note 66.

76.

AZELON, supra note 11, at xxiii.

77.

ellin, heories of Prosecution, supra note 17, at 1224-25 (discussing the illdefined concept of overcharging ).

78.

See infra text at notes 86-90.
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viewed as un ust, like mari uana possession or shoplifting,79 or that trigger
unduly harsh punishments.
ltimately, rooklyn’s prosecutors agree to place evin’s case in a
diversion program called Youth and Congregations in Partnership
(YCP).80 If evin completes a program consisting of drug testing, curfews,
and weekly trips to a social worker, the prosecutor will dismiss the case
after a year.81 a elon reports that the burdensome conditions are actually
a relief to evin because now his friends and the neighborhood could
see that he hadn’t gotten off scot-free, that he wasn’t a snitch. 82
After the udge assigned to evin’s case refuses to sign off on the
agreement, viewing it as too lenient, the parties take the case to another
udge. evin completes the year, plus eighty hours of community service.
The prosecution dismisses the case and evin’s record is cleared. 83
a elon notes that this is the third time that criminal charges against
evin were resolved through a diversion program.84
In a elon’s view, this is what ustice looks like because evin is not
dangerous. The community did not need to place him behind bars. Many
would agree,85 but not everyone. This is what makes evin’s case so
important. Assuming that rooklyn’s prosecutors offered evin diversion
because they disagree with New York’s strict gun laws, the case illustrates
an increasingly prominent feature of the prosecutorial landscape.

79.

AZELON, supra note 11, at 156 (describing the priorities of the participants
in a Fair and ust Prosecution convening). Fair and ust Prosecution, as
explained by its executive director, is a supportive network and concierge
service for D.A.s with aspirations for reform. d. at 152.

80.

d. at xxiv, 30.

81.

d. at 30.

82.

d. at 145.

83.

d. at 248-49.

84.

d. at xvi, xvii. a elon’s description of the first instance when, at age 16,
evin got five hundred hours of community service, is vague but seems
consistent with diversion since it references a charge but no ad udication. d.
at xvi.

85.

See, e. ., Paul utler, Prosecutors Role in Causin
and Solvin
the
Problem of Mass ncarceration, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2019) (reviewing EMILY
AZELON, CHARGED), https: www.washingtonpost.com outlook prosecutorsrole-in-causing--and-solving--the-problem-of-massincarceration 2019 04 19 d370d844-5c93-11e9-a00e050dc7b82693 story.html https: perma.cc 2E 8- A68 .
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The prosecutor’s actions in evin’s case frustrate the preferences of a
host of other criminal ustice actors. a elon notes that even New York
City progressives favor strict application of the gun laws. Mayor ill de
lasio spearheaded the rooklyn gun court where evin’s case is heard to
speed up and strengthen the prosecution of gun possession cases in New
York. 86 In 2006, New York’s legislature eliminated a provision that gave
udges the option of not imposing ail time on people found guilty of
illegally possessing a loaded firearm. 87 The New York City Police
Department (NYPD) similarly urged ero tolerance for gun offenders and
wanted to shut YCP down. 88 Offering an uncertain coda to a elon’s
reporting, a recent NYPD press release claiming to be responding to an
increase in homicides centered in rooklyn touts its partnership with the
District Attorney’s office to work collaboratively to ensure that those who
illegally carry . . . firearms will be prosecuted to the full extent of the
law. 89
The tension depicted above provides a fertile factual context to reflect
on a elon’s theme: the benefits of prosecutorial power. The rooklyn
prosecutors exercised the power of lenience to achieve an outcome at odds
with the wishes of the Mayor, police, legislature, and the assigned udge.90
This is where a elon, who throughout the book rails against the
breathtaking power of American prosecutors,91 seems inconsistent.
86.

AZELON, supra note 11, at 53. a elon notes that de lasio’s endorsement
derived from searching for an alternative to New York’s previous gun
policing strategy: stop-and-frisk. d. at 65.

87.

Michael S. Schmidt, Main hreat to Burress s a Sentencin Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2008), https: www.nytimes.com 2008 12 03 sports football 03
weapon.html https: perma.cc L9EG- WR .

88.

AZELON, supra note 11, at 31.

89.

Press Release, New York Police Department, Citywide Overall Crime
Continues to Decline in February 2019 (Mar. 4, 2019),
https: www1.nyc.gov site nypd news pr0304 citywide-overall-crimecontinues-decline-february-2019 0 https: perma.cc 62 6-G PC .

90.

See ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 176 (defining power in
this context as the prosecutor’s ability to achieve a goal when other actors
(legislators, udges, police) resist ) cf. ulie Shaw, nder DA Krasner, More
Gun Possession Cases Get Court Diversionary Pro ram, PHILA. IN IRER ( une
23, 2019), https: www.inquirer.com news philadelphia-district-attorneylarry-krasner-gun-possession-cases-diverted-ard-probationary-program20190623.html https: perma.cc 789-TG
(describing similar diversion
of gun cases in Philadelphia under Larry rasner).

91.

AZELON, supra note 11, at xxv.
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Readers, particularly those outside the progressive fold, will be left longing
for a theory to reconcile the apparent inconsistency. If this is about more
than ust politics (my-powerful-prosecutors-are-good-your-powerfulprosecutors-are-bad), we need a principle to distinguish constructive from
worrisome exercises of prosecutorial power. ut first, let’s consider
a elon’s second case study.
B.

oura Jackson

Noura ackson’s story starts on a horrific day in une 2005 when her
mother, a thirty-nine-year-old investment banker, is stabbed to death. 92
ackson discovers the body in a bedroom and calls 911. Finding no signs of
forced entry, police suspect ackson of the crime.93 Although the case is
entirely circumstantial, 94 the police arrest ackson and a grand ury
indicts her for first-degree murder.95
Trial goes badly for everyone. ackson does not testify in her own
defense.96 In fact, her attorney calls no witnesses.97 The assigned
prosecutor, Amy Weirich, violates ackson’s Fifth Amendment rights
92.

d. at 3-4 see also Emily a elon, She Was Convicted of Killin Her Mother.
Prosecutors Withheld the Evidence hat Would Have Freed Her, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Aug. 1, 2017), https: www.nytimes.com 2017 08 01 maga ine she
-was-convicted-of-killing-her-mother-prosecutors-withheld-the-evidencethat-would-have-freed-her.html https: perma.cc H2G4- WTL .

93.

See Glenn Ruppel Alexa Valiente, How A Woman Won Her Release from
Prison Years After Bein Convicted of Her Mother s Murder, A C NEWS (Mar.
23, 2017), https: abcnews.go.com S woman-won-release-prison-yearsconvicted-mothers-murder story id 46313117 https: perma.cc ME3EZZC5 . See also State v. ackson, No. W2009-01709-CCA-R3CD, 2012 WL
6115084, at 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (quoting testimony that
while the window in a kitchen door leading to the garage was broken,
there was no forced point of entry at the residence, and the doors and
windows were locked. ).

94.

AZELON, supra note 11, at 15.

95.

See State v. ackson, No. W2009-01709-CCA-R3CD, 2012 WL 6115084, at 3
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (noting indictment).

96.

a elon reports the conventional wisdom that putting ackson on the
stand was a big gamble. AZELON, supra note 11, at 115. Declining to testify
was also a gamble. See effrey ellin, he Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395
(2018).

97.
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AZELON, supra note 11, at 115.
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during closing argument, theatrically exclaiming in front of the ury, ust
tell us where you were. 98 The prosecution team fails to turn over evidence
that would have impeached a prosecution witness99 until shortly after the
trial.100
After nine hours of deliberation, the ury finds ackson guilty of
second-degree murder.101 The udge sentences her to nearly twenty-one
years in prison.102 The tide turns when the Tennessee Supreme Court
reverses ackson’s conviction due to the prosecutors’ misconduct.103
Rather than risk a new trial, ackson accepts a plea deal that requires her
to serve another year and three months in prison.104 In all, ackson spends
over a decade behind bars.105
ackson’s case presents the most basic dilemma facing the criminal
ustice system and its prosecutors: factual uncertainty. ackson’s trial took
two weeks the prosecution called forty-five witnesses, and three hundred
and seventy-six exhibits were introduced. 106 a elon argues compellingly
that ackson is innocent.107 Not everyone agrees. Asked years later, District
Attorney Weinrich remained absolutely certain of Noura’s guilt. 108
Prosecutors brought in after the appellate reversal from another office
similarly refused to dismiss the case.109 The ury that convicted ackson

98.

See Griffin v. California, 380 .S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the
Constitution forbids . . . comment by the prosecution on the accused’s
silence ).

99.

See Giglio v. nited States, 405 .S. 150, 155 (1972) (holding that
prosecutors must disclose material impeachment evidence).

100.

AZELON, supra note 11, at 119-21.

101. d. at 119.
102. d. at 121.
103. d. at 185.
104. d. at 236.
105. See Ruppel
Valiente, supra note 93 (detailing the time ackson spent
incarcerated).
106. State v. ackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tenn. 2014).
107.

AZELON, supra note 11, at 15-16.

108. d. at 16 see also Ruppel

Valiente, supra note 93.

109. See April Thompson, Witnesses in oura Jackson s Case Refused to estify in
ew
rial, NEWS CHANNEL 3 WREG MEMPHIS (May 20, 2015),
https: wreg.com 2015 05 20 witnesses-in-noura- acksons-case-refusedto-testify-in-new-trial https: perma.cc A6SF-GGE9 (reporting that the
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thought her guilty (although without seeing all the evidence). The trial
udge did too, explaining after trial: I think Noura ackson had a very fair
trial, and she was obviously guilty. 110 The appellate udges who reviewed
the case found the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, an
admittedly low standard, but one designed to screen out the weakest
cases.111 One of those udges wrote that the proof of guilt although not
overwhelming, is relatively strong. 112
The media loves cases with factual uncertainty and so does the public.
Americans can experience Robert Durst (perhaps) get away with murder
in H O’s documentary, he Jin 113 Steven Avery and rendan Dassey
(possibly) wrongfully imprisoned in Netflix’s Makin a Murderer 114 and
Adnan Syed’s (possible) wrongful conviction in the podcast Serial.115
Various iterations of the (is-it-a-)true-crime phenomenon populate the
airwaves every night.116 ackson’s case could easily oin this genre.
a elon is right that when it comes to cases of factual uncertainty,
prosecutors need guidance. It is remarkable how little thought has been
given to the precise standard for prosecution in this context.117 In a recent
article, I suggest the following standard: A prosecutor should only

new prosecutors insisted that they got what they wanted with the plea
deal).
110. Ruppel

Valiente, supra note 93.

111. See Jackson, 444 S.W.3d at 592 ( T he evidence of guilt in this case was
entirely circumstantial and, while sufficient to support the conviction, cannot
be described as overwhelming. ) State v. ackson, No. W2009-01709-CCAR3CD, 2012 WL 6115084, at 64 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012) ( T he evidence is
sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. ).
112. Jackson, 2012 WL 6115084, at 67.
113.

he Jin (H O 2015), https: www.hbo.com the- inx-the-life-and-deaths-ofrobert-durst https: perma.cc Y R2-H5 .

114. Makin a Murderer (Netflix 2015), https: www.netflix.com title 80000770
https: perma.cc 5L2-WF7M .
115. Serial Season ne, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (2014),
https: serialpodcast.org season-one https: perma.cc EE3 -RA R .
116. See, e. ., ill Carter, A Prime ime rue Crime Spree, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19,
2011), https: www.nytimes.com 2011 08 21 arts television true-crimetv-on-shows-like-dateline.html https: perma.cc S5WA-H6PL (chronicling
television shows).
117. See ellin, heories of Prosecution, supra note 17, at 1221 (critici ing the lack
of concrete ethics guidance for prosecutors).
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charge a case when the prosecutor expects that the evidence introduced at
trial will prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 118 ut as
ackson’s case illustrates, the standard is ust a starting point. People will
inevitably disagree about its application. If a elon were the prosecutor,
she would apply the standard to dismiss the case against ackson. Weirich
reached the opposite conclusion.
To explain the disagreement, a elon suggests that Weirich is a bad
prosecutor, suffering from tunnel vision and an office culture that
placed winning above other values. 119 ut, as a elon notes, Weirich
talks about prosecutors the same way a elon does. In a column about the
prosecutorial role, Weirich writes: As I tell our new assistant district
attorneys at orientation, our ob is to do the right thing every day for the
right reason. That might mean dismissing a difficult case because the proof
is simply not there . . . . M y ob is to see that ustice is done. 120
Weirich and a elon appear to agree on the principle: ustice. They
disagree about what ustice looks like in the ackson case. This kind of
disagreement is probably inevitable. It is not something that we can
realistically expect progressive prosecutors to resolve. In fact, an emphasis
on achieving ustice, a progressive tenet, may fuel the dangers of
prosecutorial excess by subtly undercutting adherence to legal rules (like
transparency requirements) in favor of loftier goals.121
Fortunately, there is another remedy for prosecutorial overreach:
checks and balances. The criminal ustice system expects prosecutors to
bring bad cases. There are over 25,000 prosecutors and an almost infinite
variety of cases.122 There will always be prosecutors who get it wrong.
That’s why prosecutors cannot punish unilaterally.

118. d. at 1223.
119.

AZELON, supra note 11, at 16-19.

120. Amy Weirich, Opinion, he Chan in Role of the District Attorney, DAILY
MEMPHIAN (Dec. 07, 2018), https: dailymemphian.com article 1622 Thechanging-role-of-the-district-attorney https: perma.cc DV6Z-TTTH .
121. See ellin, heories of Prosecution, supra note 17, at 1216-20 (highlighting
dangers of the amorphous do ustice command).
122. d. at 1210 n.44 (citing Steve W. Perry Duren anks, Prosecutors in State
Courts, 2007 - Statistical Tables,
REA OF
ST. STAT. 2 (DEC. 2011),
https: www.b s.gov content pub pdf psc07st.pdf
https: perma.cc 6GNZ-4RR
( The nearly 25,000 FTE assistant
prosecutors employed in 2007 represented a 7 increase from the number
reported in 2001. . . . ).
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The first check is legislators who need to understand that human error
is an inevitable component of criminal prosecution. When it comes to
criminal law, less is more.
The next check on the State’s power to punish comes in the form of the
system’s investigators. Police generate the evidence that points to guilt or
innocence. In most cases, prosecutors don’t get involved until the police
identify a potential target of the State’s punitive powers and rule out (at
least in their mind) alternative culprits.123
The next two checks consist of regular people. In many urisdictions, a
grand ury determines whether there is probable cause to charge.124 If
disagreement persists, another ury decides, at trial, whether the
prosecutor has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.125 Guilty verdicts
must be unanimous.126 Throughout the proceedings, defense attorneys
play a critical role in bringing out weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. To
ensure that the prosecutor and police follow the rules, a neutral udge
presides. When the trial udge fails, there are appellate courts.
These mechanisms were present in ackson’s case. A grand ury
indicted her.127 A ury convicted her.128 The trial udge concurred.129 The
Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed her case and reversed her conviction.

123. See ellin, he Power of Prosecutors, supra note 32, at 192 (detailing the role
of police).
124. See .S. CONST. amend. V ( No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
ury . . . . ) Roger A. Fairfax, r., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional
Desi n, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 707 n.5 (2008) ( A bout half of the fifty
states have some form of grand ury requirement. (citing SARA S N EALE ET
AL., GRAND RY LAW AND PRACTICE 8.2 (2d ed. 2005)).
125. See n re Winship, 397 .S. 358, 364 (1970) ( T he Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged. ).
126. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020).
127. See State v. ackson, No. W2009-01709-CCA-R3CD, 2012 WL 6115084, at 3
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (noting indictment).
128.

AZELON, supra note 11, at 119.

129. d. at 121 (denying a motion for a new trial). In Tennessee, a trial udge shall
order the entry of udgment of acquittal . . . if the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a conviction. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 29(b).
240

DEFENDING PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION

Tennessee’s parole board considered but denied ackson’s release. 130
Tennessee’s governor issued a number of pardons during the relevant
period but did not grant one to ackson.131 Of course, a elon is right that
the prosecutor too played an instrumental role. ut all of these actors
mattered. Everyone in the system is supposed to protect the factually
innocent. If ackson is innocent, her case reflects a cascade of failures
across the system. It is unclear why, in this context, we should brush off
these failings to focus on Weirich (or analogous prosecutors across the
country). Nor is it obvious that progressive prosecutors will be less likely
to push legal boundaries and overlook factual ambiguity in their own
ealous pursuit of ustice.
Compare ackson’s prosecution with another example of prosecution
in the face of factual uncertainty. In 2015, altimore’s State’s Attorney,
progressive prosecutor Marilyn Mosby, prosecuted six police officers
involved in the death of Freddie Gray.132 Announcing these charges, Mosby
leaped onto the national stage as heroine and lightning rod. 133 Like
ackson’s case, however, the Freddie Gray prosecutions involved failures
to disclose evidence134 and a controversial effort to override the Fifth

130. See elsey Ott, Woman Accused of Killin Her Mother Will Stay in Prison, NEWS
CHANNEL 3 WREG MEMPHIS (Aug. 12, 2015),
https: wreg.com 2015 08 12 woman-accused-of-killing-her-mother-tostay-in-prison https: perma.cc H4P - 287 .
131. Adam Tamburin, Gov. Bill Haslam Granted
People Clemency, But He Has Yet
to Address Cyntoia Brown Case, TENNESSEAN (Dec. 20, 2018),
https: www.tennessean.com story news crime 2018 12 20 cyntoiabrown-gov-bill-haslam-no-clemency-decision-tennessee 2378424002
https: perma.cc 9 M9-48NE .
132. See Wil S. Hylton, Baltimore vs. Marilyn Mosby, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 28,
2016), https: www.nytimes.com 2016 10 02 maga ine marilyn-mosbyfreddie-gray-baltimore.html https: perma.cc 4ZZ-GW A .
133. Heidi Mitchell, Meet Marilyn Mosby he Baltimore Prosecutor in the Eye of
the Storm, VOG E ( uly 2015), https: www.vogue.com article marilynmosby-baltimore-prosecutor https: perma.cc AW47-E6 S .
134. See Safia Samee Ali, rial of an Driver in Freddie Gray Case Reveals
Prosecutor
iolations,
N C
NEWS
( une
23,
2016),
https: www.nbcnews.com storyline baltimore-unrest trial-van-driverfreddie-gray-case-reveals-prosecutor-violations-n596731
https: perma.cc 8Z5Y- 57
(detailing court rulings that prosecutors
committed Brady violations).
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Amendment protections offered to criminal defendants.135
Mosby’s decision to pursue the Freddie Gray prosecutions
encountered resistance. The prosecution tried the six officers
separately.136 The first case ended in a mistrial when the ury was unable
to reach a verdict.137 The second and third trials ended with not guilty
verdicts.138 nable to obtain consensus from the necessary criminal ustice
actors, Mosby could not impose punishment. She dismissed the remaining
charges.139
Cases that move forward despite factual uncertainty do not illustrate
the unbridled power of prosecutors. They bring out the multitude of actors
who must concur whenever the State imposes punishment.140 Focusing on
135. See ustin Fenton, Freddie Gray Case Maryland Hi h Court Says fficer Porter
Must estify A ainst All Five Co Defendants, ALT. S N (Mar. 8, 2016),
https: www.baltimoresun.com news crime bs-md-ci-appeals-courtruling-freddie-gray-20160308-story.html
https: perma.cc 265P- ASL
(quoting a law professor after the prosecution’s unusual success in
compelling one co-defendant to testify against another, stating that the
precedent provides a new arrow in the quiver of prosecutors when they
deal with co-defendant cases’
I hope . . . that the kind of unique
circumstances here makes this O in this instance, but . . . will not change
how co-defendant cases are typically tried.’ ).
136. See Hylton, supra note 132 (chronicling cases).
137. Sheryl Gay Stolberg
ess idgood, Mistrial Declared in Case of fficer
Char ed in Freddie Gray s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015) (mistrial of
Officer
William
G.
Porter),
https: www.nytimes.com 2015 12
17 us freddie-gray-baltimore-police-trial.html
https: perma.cc 8P P5G .
138. ess idgood
Timothy Williams, Police fficer in Freddie Gray Case s
Ac uitted of All Char es, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2016),
https: www.nytimes.com 2016 05 24 us baltimore-officer-edwardnero-freddie-gray-court-verdict https: perma.cc 2 V-R HY (describing
acquittal of Officer Edward Nero) ess idgood
Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Ac uittal in Freddie Gray Case Casts Doubts About Future rials, N.Y. Times
( une 23, 2016), https: www.nytimes.com 2016 06 24 us verdictfreddie-gray-caesar-goodson-baltimore.html https: perma.cc DP2 -FFTR
(describing acquittal of Officer Caesar R. Goodson r.).
139. Sheryl Gay Stolberg
ess idgood, All Char es Dropped A ainst Baltimore
fficers in Freddie Gray Case, N.Y. TIMES ( uly 27, 2016),
https: www.nytimes.com 2016 07 28 us charges-dropped-against-3remaining-officers-in-freddie-gray-case https: perma.cc D9 5-C3H9 .
140. See supra Part I and note 38.
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prosecutors in this context lets these other actors off the hook. There are
lessons here for prosecutors. ut these are old lessons. Prosecutors, no
matter what their guiding philosophy, must follow the rules and should
have no interest in prosecuting the innocent. ackson needed prosecutorial
competence, not progressive lenience. She also needed thorough police
investigation, a stronger defense, open-minded udges and uries, and wellfunctioning parole and pardon systems.
II.

ILDING A NEW NARRATIVE

a elon uses the two stories described in the preceding Part to
illustrate the power of prosecutors and the appeal of progressive
prosecution. rooklyn’s progressive prosecutors did the right thing by
giving evin a break.141 Tennessee’s win-at-all-costs prosecutors did the
wrong thing by sending ackson to prison despite her potential
innocence.142 To my mind, the stories illustrate different things. evin’s
story illustrates the challenges and potential of the progressive
prosecution movement a movement that can leverage the oftenoverlooked power of prosecutorial lenience to check the State’s power to
punish the factually guilty. ackson’s story says less about progressive
prosecutors and nothing about lenience. It reveals the State’s power to
punish even the factually innocent so long as all of the criminal ustice
actors act in concert. In doing so, it highlights the importance of police,
udges, uries, governors, and parole boards.
Declining to prosecute the innocent is not a progressive position. It is a
consensus position. That’s why when it comes to cases of factual
uncertainty like ackson’s, the real protagonists are the investigators. If
police generate sufficient evidence of guilt (or innocence), this kind of
uncertainty disappears. When police fail to uncover exculpatory evidence,
defense attorneys become critical. uries too must play a role. When uries
re ect the prosecution’s evidence in weak cases, prosecutors become
reluctant to bring those cases. In fact, rooklyn’s uries may explain
evin’s lenient outcome better than rooklyn’s prosecutors. David
Dorfman and Chris Ii ima report that in the early 1990s, rooklyn uries
were acquitting in gun possession cases at an average rate of 56 . 143
That’s shockingly high. Dorfman and II ima suggest that because the
141.

AZELON, supra note 11, at 296.

142. d. at 297.
143. David N. Dorfman
Chris . Ii ima, Fictions, Fault, and For iveness Jury
ullification in A ew Conte t, 28 . MICH. .L. REFORM 861, 887 (1995).
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prosecutors know that rooklyn uries will very likely acquit a
defendant in a garden variety’ gun possession case, they have little choice
but to offer more attractive plea deals.144 The prosecutors in evin’s case
would be well aware of the difficulty of convicting in his garden variety
case. The opposite dynamic likely worked against ackson, whose fate
ultimately rested in the hands not of a Tennessee prosecutor but a
Tennessee ury.
The two scenarios also highlight very different strands of
prosecutorial reform: one that seeks to use prosecutors to reform the
system and another that seeks to reform prosecutors themselves. The
latter strand, which is at play in ackson’s case, is ancient. Prosecutors
must play fair, uphold the Constitution, and carefully weigh the evidence.
This is the theme of the 1935 case Ber er v. nited States, which famously
commands that prosecutors, as servants of the law, must hew closely to
the rules while ensuring that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. 145
As Ber er recogni ed, we don’t need transformative prosecutors to guard
against convictions of the innocent, we ust need competent prosecutors.
Competent police, uries, udges, governors, and parole boards are even
more important. y contrast, the strand of reform at issue in evin’s case
is new, bringing the transformative power of prosecutorial lenience out of
the shadows. Distinguishing between the prosecutors’ roles in these two
scenarios allows a clearer vision of the places where we can expect a new
wave of prosecutors to transform the criminal ustice system.
What makes evin’s case important on a larger stage is that, in
contrast to ackson’s case, evin’s factual guilt of the charged offense is
clear (even if the likelihood of conviction was uncertain). Disagreement
about what the prosecutor should do in evin’s case turns on contested
conceptuali ations of the prosecutorial role. As a elon frames it, the
question becomes whether evin deserved, or the community benefits
from, a mandatory 3.5-year sentence.146 After all, if we accept evin’s
version, he was merely trying to help his friend avoid a gun conviction. To
broaden the discussion, we could ask similar questions whenever

144. d. at n.143. Dorfman and Ii ima suggest that the prosecutors reacted to the
high acquittal rates by weeding-out sic the cases that may be in the least
bit problematic at trial resulting in a lower acquittal rate in subsequent
years. d. Still, a elon notes that in the first year of the gun court, one third
of the trials resulted in an acquittal. AZELON, supra note 11, at 136.
145.

erger v. nited States, 295 .S. 78, 88 (1935).

146.

AZELON, supra note 11, at xxiii.
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prosecutors disagree with unpopular laws, like mari uana or shoplifting
offenses, or severe mandatory or udicially-imposed sentences.
There is no consensus on the prosecutors’ role in circumstances like
those in evin’s case. This is where progressive prosecution becomes a
coherent concept, distinct from traditional calls for competent, thoughtful,
and non-corrupt prosecution.
nlike a traditional by-the-book
prosecutor, the new wave of prosecutors a elon chronicles can serve as a
check on the system’s severity by counteracting overly-punitive police,
legislatures, udges, and uries even in cases, like evin’s, when the
defendant’s guilt is clear.
In a democratic system characteri ed by mass incarceration, there is a
strong argument for policy-based prosecutor lenience. Too much
prosecutorial power is problematic, but lenience is different. Obviously, all
would be outraged if the legislature repealed the gun laws and the
prosecutor nevertheless sent evin to prison for gun possession. That
would violate the system’s checks and balances. The rooklyn prosecutors’
decision to divert evin’s case is the opposite. Like the police officer who
declines to ticket a speeding motorist, letting evin pass through the
ustice system without a conviction is an example of checks and balances
in operation. Contrary to the critics, this form of prosecutorial power the
power to dictate lenience is both consistent with the system’s design and
faithful to traditional worries about the accumulation of prosecutor power.
When it comes to prosecutorial lenience, then, more prosecutor power
is better and (contrary to traditional academic voices) the best reform for
that power is no reform.147 Prosecutors can already offer leniency without
check. This is the power reform-minded prosecutors and their supporters
can leverage unapologetically to temper the overly punitive dynamics of
American criminal ustice.
There remains the concern about how prosecutors dispense leniency.
Prosecutors may offer leniency inequitably, unfairly, or even corruptly.
This concern applies throughout the criminal ustice system, to other
actors such as police, parole boards, legislatures, and governors. The best
answer with respect to prosecutors is that there are political limits. If a
prosecutor acts too leniently, her constituents can vote her out of office.
Commentators downplay the prospect that political accountability can
control wayward prosecutors.148 ut this critique only resonates in the
147. Cf. ellin, Reassessin Prosecutorial Power, supra note 16, at 854 (critiquing
reform proposals like legislative plea bargaining guidelines as more likely to
increase than decrease severity).
148. See, e. ., Stephanos ibas, ransparency and Participation in Criminal
Procedure, 81 N.Y. . L. REV. 911, 931-46 (2006) ruce Green
Ellen
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context of undue severity.149 Voters can, and do, counteract excessive
leniency. Two of the most prominent progressive prosecution victories (in
Chicago and St. Louis) channeled voter dissatisfaction with incumbents’
decisions not to vigorously pursue cases.150 In 2018, California voters
recalled a udge who imposed a lenient sentence in a sexual assault case. 151
And American politicians across the nation famously worry about the
threat of being Willie Horton’ed,’ i.e., targeted by negative campaign
advertisements highlighting lenient criminal policy choices.152
Guidance regarding how prosecutors should exercise leniency in
various circumstances is beyond the scope of this Essay. Here, the question
is whether it is proper to offer leniency based on a policy disagreement
with the legislature or other actors. An affirmative answer is critically
important because it substantially expands the limits of permissible
prosecutorial action in an era of mass incarceration. How exactly
prosecutors should operate within those limits is a question for another
piece.153
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability . , 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 66
(2017) Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail s, 6 OHIO ST. . CRIM.
L. 581, 582 (2009).
149. See Rachel E. arkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencin , 105 COL M. L.
REV. 1276, 1281 (2005) ( A n opponent’s charge that they are soft on crime
can be devastating to their political futures because it resonates with
voters. ) William . Stunt , he Patholo ical Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 530 (2001) (suggesting that voters seek conviction and
punishment of people who commit the kinds of offenses that voters fear ).
150. See Note, he Parado of Pro ressive Prosecution, 132 HARV. L. REV. 748,
754-55 (2018) (chronicling the trend in the context of police shootings).
151. See Maggie Astor, California oters Remove Jud e Aaron Persky, Who Gave a
Month Sentence for Se ual Assault, N.Y. TIMES ( une 6, 2018),
https: www.nytimes.com 2018 06 06 us politics udge-persky-brockturner-recall.html https: perma.cc 7F Z-ANR4 see also Stephen F. Smith,
he Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 329 n.161
(2008) (describing the famous example of three California Supreme Court
ustices . . . defeated in reelection campaigns in 1986 based on a record that
was decidedly hostile to the death penalty. ).
152. See eth Schwart apfel
ill eller, Willie Horton Revisited, MARSHALL
PRO ECT
(May
13,
2015)
(describing
the
phenomenon),
https: www.themarshallpro ect.org 2015 05 13 willie-horton-revisited
https: perma.cc R D5-7G9 .
153. See enerally ellin, heories of Prosecution, supra note 17 (discussing
normative theories of prosecution).
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In a time of rapidly changing perceptions of prosecutors, it is critical to
find consensus on the appropriate boundaries of prosecutorial power. This
is especially true when the boundaries evolving in the real world appear to
be in tension with traditional academic critiques. y sketching broad but
neutral boundaries, this Essay responds to powerful structural ob ections
to prosecutor-driven reform: specifically, that (1) prosecutors are already
too powerful and (2) should play a more restricted, less partisan role that
does not usurp legislators, udges, or uries. The best answer to these
ob ections is not, as one commonly hears, that all-powerful prosecutors
can do whatever they or their voters want.154 a elon, for example,
reassures us that: We, the people, elect state prosecutors, and that means
their power is our power. 155 ut in a democracy, our rarely means
everyone. And this framing offers no limits beyond what a ma ority of
voters in any locality can stand. I think a better answer and one that
places some limits on prosecutorial might is that many of the actors in
the American criminal ustice system, including the prosecutor, possess a
unilateral power to dispense lenience. When any one of those actors
invokes that power, it is an example of the system’s checks and balances in
operation, not a breakdown of the rule of law.
CONCL SION
Readers of Emily a elon’s excellent new book, Char ed, will find her
enthusiasm for the burgeoning prosecutor-driven reform movement
contagious. ut contrary to the academic voices upon which she builds, the
key to the movement’s success is not prosecutorial omnipotence. It is the
opposite. Local prosecutors are not (and should not be) benevolent
dictators presiding over the criminal ustice system even if we like their
politics. Instead, the movement can highlight limits on prosecutorial might.
154. See, e. ., rooklyn Defender Services, Power of Prosecutors, YO T E (Sep. 10,
2017), https: www.youtube.com watch v rgvlx7MnqA
https: perma.cc 2A- D8 ( What the public wants to have happen is
what the District Attorney should be doing. ) atherine . Moy et al.,
Stanford Criminal ustice Ctr., Rate My District Attorney owards a Scorecard
for Prosecutors
ffices, STAN. L. SCH. 4 (2018), https: wwwcdn.law.stanford.edu wpcontent uploads 2018 01 Rate My District Attorney anuary 2018.pdf
https: perma.cc 9N3R- 6AF (proposing ratings to reveal whether a
prosecutors’ office has effectively pursued the electorate’s policy
priorities. ).
155.

AZELON, supra note 11, at xxviii.
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Prosecutors exercise power across two dimensions, and both are
restricted. When prosecutors exercise lenience, the local electorate can
enforce limits at the ballot box. When prosecutors seek to invoke the
State’s power to punish, police, legislatures, udges, uries, and other actors
determine the prosecutor’s success. As a result, progressive prosecutors
and their champions can celebrate the system’s checks and balances
alongside a narrow form of prosecutorial power: leniency. Indeed, a
reminder that prosecutorial leniency is ust one of the system’s many
checks on the State’s power to punish may turn out to be the most
important lesson progressive prosecutors have to offer.
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